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This paper analyzes a market with three firms. One of them is the dominant firm and 
the two others are fringe firms. The formulation of demand allows a comparison 
between price competition with heterogeneous and homogeneous products. Because 
a parameterization is required to assure that market size is the same in both 
scenarios, no general conclusions can be drawn. But it can be shown that in large 
markets with relatively inelastic demand for the fringe firms’ products and a cost 
advantage of the dominant firm, the fringe firms are better off if they produce a 
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In many markets large differences in the market shares of suppliers exist. Often a 
group of dominant firms serve the better part of the buyers.
1 In this article the 
extreme case is analyzed, namely a market with one firm with a large market share 
and fringe firms as small rivals.  
  There are indeed markets where one dominant firm has a long-lasting advantage 
over its smaller competitors – like Microsoft. Two prominent examples in Germany 
are the markets for soup seasoning and baking ingredients. The brand "Maggi" has 
been the market leader for decades and its smaller competitors have never reached 
a noteworthy market share although large supermarkets also sell less known 
substitutes. The same is true for Dr. Oetker’s baking powder and pudding. Although 
the competitor’s products are cheaper by far, Dr. Oetker remains the market leader. 
In both cases the name of the products is associated with approved quality, and in 
relation to the entire meal the costs are small. Customers believe that their home-
made meals are tastier if they purchase the well-known brands. As in the model of 
Schmalensee (1982) the risk of failure hinders the consumers to replace a reliable 
product.
2 A less prominent example is the market for city maps. Falk city maps are 
dominant in Germany, but there are many small producers of cheaper and smaller 
maps that are sufficient for short trips.  
  The situation of the market leader with a high price and a large market share is 
comfortable. But what is the position of the fringe firms? Is it optimal for them to be 
small competitors in a heterogeneous market or would they be better off if the pro-
ducts were homogeneous? To answer this question we need a model that 
discriminates between these two types of markets with a dominant firm. Hence, with 
identical prices of all competitors the market has to be of the same size. In case of 
homogeneity the classical model is that of Forchheimer. This dominant firm model 
with a homogeneous product can be found in every industrial organization textbook. 
While the entry of fringe firms and the consequences for the position of the dominant 
firm have been widely discussed (see e. g. Berck and Perloff 1988, Cherry 2000 and 
                                            
1 This may be the result of a sequential Stackelberg game (see e. g. Anderson/Engers 1992, 
Eaton/Ware 1987, Bongard/Wied-Nebbeling 2005). 
2 For an overview of all sorts of advantages a firm can exploit, see Geroski and Jacquemin (1984).   
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the literature cited there), I found no application to differentiated products.
3 There are 
many models for oligopolies with horizontally differentiated heterogeneous products.
4 
But a spatial model like the circular city or a Hotelling line cannot be used here, 
because in case of homogeneity both spaces would shrink to a point, and the 
outcome in equilibrium would be Bertrand (price equals marginal costs). Other 
oligopoly models with heterogeneous firms refer to markets with symmetric demand 
(see e.g. Wang/Zhao, 2007). But all of these models are not consistent with the 
Forchheimer model of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe.  
  Therefore a system of demand functions is introduced here that allows for different 
market shares and heterogeneous preferences. Nevertheless, adding up the demand 
for the equally priced products gives total demand that can also be used for the 
Forchheimer model. By calculating the equilibriums in both markets and comparing 
the producer surpluses of the fringe firms, we can see in which scenario – 
homogeneous or heterogeneous – they are better off. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the basic assumptions of the 
models. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the price equilibrium in the heterogeneous 
and the homogeneous market with the focus on the outcome for the fringe firms. In 
section 5 the producer surpluses in both scenarios are analyzed, using a comparative 





For tractability reasons the analysis is restricted to one dominant and two fringe firms. 
To compare the heterogeneous with the homogeneous market the model has to fulfill 
the following characteristics: 
(I) In any case, the market share of the dominant firm must be considerably higher 
than the share of any fringe firm.  
(II) The two fringe firms i = 2,3 are identical. They produce with quadratic costs:   
Ci = eqi
2 and thus have upward sloping marginal costs. Increasing marginal costs are 
                                            
3 The model of Blank et al. is an exception. This model is not applicable because it cannot be 
transferred to the homogeneous case.  
4 See e. g. Perloff/Salop (1985) and Anderson/Palma (1988).  
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a necessary assumption for the equilibrium in the homogeneous market. The 
dominant firm produces with constant marginal cost, c. We refrain from fixed costs.  
(III) With identical prices of the three firms, the quantity in both markets is the same. 
Otherwise, we would have incomparable market sizes. 
  The next assumptions refer to the demand in the heterogeneous market: 
(IV) We make the conventional and necessary assumption that the demand of each 
firm reacts stronger to changes of its own price than to changes of a competitor’s 
price.  
(V) To handle the system analytically, the market shares at zero prices have to be 
prefixed. 
(VI) Demand of the three firms must add up to total demand. This requires some 
prefixing of the reaction to changes in price according to (IV). 
 
 
3. Price equilibrium in the heterogeneous market 
 
Total demand depends on the prices of the dominant firm and the two fringe firms. It 
can be written as: 
  Q  =  α  –  βp1  –  γp2  –  γp3  .    (1) 
The formulation of the demand function is quite general
5, whereas for the functions of 
the three individual firms some specifications are needed.  According to assumptions 
(IV) to (VI), the demand equations of the three firms shall be: 
 q 1  =  0.6α  –  3βp1  +   γp2   +  γp3     with  3β > γ (2) 
 q 2  =  0.2α  –  3γp2   +   βp1  +  γp3  with  3γ > β (3) 
 q 3  =  0.2α  –  3γp3   +   βp1  +  γp2    with  3γ > β  .  (4) 
Adding up equations (2) to (4) gives total demand [equation (1)] as required. The 
market shares at zero prices are in accordance with assumption (I). The fixing of this 
market shares is somewhat disturbing, but otherwise it would not be possible to 
guarantee that the sum of the market shares adds up to one without complicating the 
analytical handling severely. Since the values of the parameters β and γ are not 
appointed by themselves, the reaction of demand to price variations of the dominant 
                                            




i q , that can be derived as the 
result of consumers maximizing their utility (see Bloch, 1995).  
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firm and the fringe firms can vary within the limits on the right hand side of equations 
(2) to (4). We will consider these variations in detail in section 5.  
 
We consider a simultaneous price game where the three firms want to maximize 
profits.
6 Since the market is heterogeneous, fringe firms do not have to adopt the 
price of the dominant firm but are able to calculate the profit-maximizing price by 
themselves. As usual in simultaneous price games, firms take the prices of the 
competitors as given and they can estimate demand correctly. 
  Hence, the dominant firm maximizes Π1 = (p1 – c)q1 with respect to p1. With 
dΠ1/dp1 = 0 and solving for p1 we get its reaction function: 
 p 1 (p2,p3)  =   ( )
β
+ γ + β + α
30
p p 5 c 15 3 3 2   .  (5) 
Since the fringe firms i = 2,3 produce with quadratic costs, their profit function is   
Πi = (pi – eqi)qi. The first order condition gives: 
 p i (p1,pj)  =   () ( ) ( )
() 1 e 3 30
p p 5 1 e 6 j 1
+ γ γ
γ + β + α + γ
   i, j = 2,3;  i ≠ j .  (6) 
In equilibrium, prices of the fringe firms are identical because demand and costs are 
the same for both. Therefore, we can substitute pi for pj. This results in the reaction 
function of one fringe firm in response to alternative prices of the dominant firm 1: 
 p i (p1)  =   ( )( )
() 5 e 12 5
p 5 1 e 6 1
+ γ γ
β + α + γ
   i = 2,3 .  (7) 
In (5) we substitute p2 and p3 with the right side of (7) and get the equilibrium price of 
the dominant firm: 
 p 1*  =   () ( )
() 7 e 15 20
5 e 12 c 15 17 e 48
+ γ β
+ γ β + + γ α
 ,  (8) 
and from (7) we derive the price of the fringe firms: 
 p i*  =   () ( )
() 7 e 15 20
c 5 3 1 e 6 3
+ γ γ
β + α + γ
 .    (9) 
                                            
6 There are two reasons for choosing a simultaneous game: first, it is consistent with the 
homogeneous case. Second, we avoid difficulties to accept the role of a price leader as mentioned in 
Tasnàdi (2004).   
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The price of the fringe firms is increasing in α, which is a parameter of market size, in 
c, the MC of the dominant firm, and in β, the strength of the demand reaction to price 
changes of the dominant firm. The derivative dpi*/de is also positive, as expected. 
The stronger the increase in the MC of the fringe firms, the higher their profit 
maximizing price must be. The derivative dpi*/dγ is negative – the more demand 
reacts to price changes of the fringe firms, the lower pi*. 
 
The equilibrium quantity is established by the prices of the dominant firm and the 
fringe firms. Inserting prices in (3) or (4) yields: 
 q i*  =   ()
() 7 e 15 20
c 5 3 9
+ γ
β + α
 .    (10) 
In accordance with pi*, the quantity of the fringe firms increases with market size (α), 
the strength of the demand reaction to price changes of the dominant firm (β), and 
the MC of the dominant firm (c). The quantity decreases with the demand reaction to 
their own price changes (γ). With respect to the MC of the fringe firms, however, the 
derivative dqi*/de is negative, as expected.  
 
The producer surplus of a fringe firm in the heterogeneous market is quoted as: 
 PRi, het ≡ Πi = (pi* – eqi*)qi* 
 PRi, het  =   () ( )
() 2
2
7 e 15 400
c 5 3 1 e 3 27
+ γ γ
β + α + γ
  .  (11) 
The profit of a fringe firm in the heterogeneous market reacts analogously to its 
output; hence: d(PRi, het)/dα > 0, d(PRi, het)/dβ > 0, d(PRi, het)/dc > 0, d(PRi, het)/dγ < 0 
and d(PRi, het)/de < 0. 
 
 
4. Equilibrium in the homogeneous market 
 
In case of homogeneity we use the traditional Forchheimer model. Thus, the 
dominant firm maximizes its profit with respect to residual demand qr, with  





Σ  .    (12)  
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The fringe firms take the price of the dominant firm as given and maximize their 
profits by equating price to marginal cost. 
 
The demand in the homogeneous market is: 
  Q  =  α  –  zp   with   z  =  β + 2γ .   (13) 
We take z because there is only one price and therefore a unique demand reaction to 
changes of that price. To be comparable with (1), z has to be the sum of β + 2γ. Only 
then demand is the same, provided that the prices of the three firms in the 
heterogeneous market are identical to each other and to the price in the 
homogeneous setting. Again, the horizontal intercept is α, while 1/z is the slope of 
the inverse demand curve. 
 
The supply of each fringe firm corresponds to its MC (= 2eqi) for every given price of 
the dominant firm. Hence, the supply of both fringe firms is
7 
 q f, agg  =  2 · qf  =  
e
1
pd .    (14) 
From (12) and (13) follows as residual demand: 
 q r  =  α  –  zpd  –  
e
1








zp d .  (15) 
The dominant firm maximizes 
  Πd = (pd – c)qr 
with respect to its price. With dΠd/dpd = 0 and solving for pd we get the price of the 
dominant firm: 




  .    (16) 
At this price, taken as given by a fringe firm, each of them supplies: 




 .    (17) 
                                            
7 To discriminate between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous market we now use the subscript 
f for the fringe firms and d for the dominant firm.   
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The quantity of the fringe firms in the homogeneous market also increases with 
market size: dqf*/dα > 0, and with the MC of the dominant firm: dqf*/c > 0. The 
derivative dqf*/dz is negative because as (16) shows, the price of the dominant firm 
declines with z. From (14) follows that the fringe firms produce a smaller quantity in 
total. Since there are only two fringe firms, the output of each firm must shrink as 
well. As expected, the derivative dqi*/de is negative; the steeper the cost function of 
the fringe firms, the smaller their optimal output is. 
 
The producer surplus of a fringe firm in the homogeneous market is composed as 
before: 
 PRf, hom ≡ Πf = (pd* – eqf*)qf*  . 
Substitution of pd* and qf* gives: 
 PRf, hom  =   ()
() 2
2




  .    (18)   
The profit of a fringe firm in the homogeneous market increases with market size and 
the MC of the dominant firm, and it decreases with a stronger demand reaction to 
price variations. The development of the producer surplus with respect to the slope of 
the cost function (e) is ambiguous, because the price set by the dominant firm 
increases with e, while the output of a fringe firm decreases.  
 
 
5. Producer surplus of the fringe firms compared 
 
Now we can evaluate if it is better to be a fringe firm with a heterogeneous instead of 
a homogeneous product. Since, with the exception of the parameter e, profit in both 
markets reacts in the same direction if demand or cost parameters shift, it is not 
possible to derive general conclusions. Thus, we have to calculate the reaction of 
profits to individual changes of the parameters, given the restrictions of the demand 
functions [equations (2) to (4)]. 
 
We start with a heterogeneous market where the products are substitutes, but not 
very close ones. The parameters are set as follows: 
α = 100;  β = 1/8;  γ = 1/8;  c = 20;  e = 2.  
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In the heterogeneous case the price of the dominant firm is p1* = 119.1, that of the 
fringe firms is pi* = 87.2. The price of the fringe is significantly lower, as expected. 
The dominant firm produces q1* = 37.2 and each fringe firm qi* = 13.1. The dominant 
firm has a market share of 58.7 percent and earns a profit of Π1* = 3680.6, while the 
producer surplus of a fringe firm is only Πi* = 798.6.  
 
In the homogeneous scenario the price set by the dominant firm is pd* = 67.1. This 
price is distinctly lower than the prices of the differentiated products. The dominant 
firm’s output amounts to qd* = 41.25 and the output of each fringe firm to qf* = 16.8. 
The market shares are 55.1 and 22.4 percent respectively. The profit of the dominant 
firm accounts for Πd* = 1944.6 and the one of a fringe firm for Πf* = 563.5. With  
Πi* > Πf*, the fringe firms in the heterogeneous market are thus better off with the 
initial parameter values (despite their smaller market shares).
8 This does not always 
have to be the case if the parameter values change.  
 
Market size 
PROPOSITION 1: The producer surplus in both markets increases with market size. 
It is larger in the heterogeneous market if demand is above a critical level.   
PROOF: The derivatives of (11) and (18) with respect to α are both positive; hence 
profit increases with market size. With the other parameter values fixed and α 
variable, the profit of a fringe firm in the heterogeneous market is higher than with a 
homogeneous product, if 
 PRi, het  > PRf, hom   
and therefore 






> + α  . 
This inequality is fulfilled for every α > 34.73. In the homogeneous market, a fringe 
firm is only better off if the market is very small. 
 
                                            
8 This result corresponds with the findings of Borenstein (1991).  
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Demand reaction to price changes of the dominant firm 
PROPOSITION 2: If the products in the heterogeneous market are weak substitutes, 
the producer surplus of a fringe firm in the heterogeneous case is higher whatever 
the demand reaction to price changes of the dominant firm. 
PROOF: To compare the profits we have to take into account that β is included in z. 
In equation (18) z has to be substituted by β + 2γ. An increasing β in the 
heterogeneous market yields a larger z in the homogeneous one. The profit 
inequality is given by: 









> + β   . 
This inequality holds for every β > 0. Whatever the reaction of demand to price 
changes of the dominant firm, a fringe firm has a higher profit in the heterogeneous 
market. However, this result depends on the values chosen. Assuming γ = ¼, which 
indicates closer substitutes, β would have to be bigger than 0.2 for profits to be 
higher in the heterogeneous market. If γ = ½, the condition is β > 0.59. Hence, the 
fringe firms are only definitely better off if their own demand is relatively price-
inelastic, in other words, if they sell a niche product. Interestingly, whatever the 
values for γ and β, a higher z due to an increasing β means that in the homogeneous 
market the profits drop, while in the heterogeneous market the fringe firms 
ameliorate.  
 
Demand reaction to price changes of fringe firms 
PROPOSITION 3: There is no definite relation between the ranking of the producer 
surplus and magnitude of the demand reaction to price changes of the fringe firms. 
PROOF: As in the previous case, γ is part of z and z has to be substituted by β+ 2γ in 














  . 
For this inequality no definite solution can be found. Assuming α = 100;  β = ⅛;   
c = 20 and e = 2, the profit in the heterogeneous market is larger if γ is smaller than 
0.2. Again, the reaction of demand to price changes of a fringe firm has to be 
moderate if the inequality applies. With better substitutability of the heterogeneous 
products fringe firms were in a relatively better position if they produced totally  
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homogeneous products. In both cases the profits shrink with an increase in γ 
(respectively in z), but the decline is weaker with homogeneity.  
 
MC of the dominant firm 
PROPOSITION 4: The producer surplus of a fringe firm in the heterogeneous market 
is bigger than in the homogeneous one if the dominant firm does not produce too 
costly.  
PROOF: It is always profitable for the fringe firms if the dominant firm is a high-cost 
producer. If the costs of the dominant firm are very high, a fringe firm benefits more in 
the homogeneous market, because: 
  () ()
9261




> +  
yields c < 57.6. Profits in the homogeneous market are lower with small MC of the 
dominant firm but they grow faster as the MC of the dominant firm increase and at 
some point they outrun the profits in the heterogeneous market. Since dominance is 
often combined with cost advantages, a fringe firm in the heterogeneous market will 
usually have the higher producer surplus.  
 
Slope of the fringe firms' cost function 
PROPOSITION 5: If the fringe firms do not produce with very low costs, the producer 
surplus in the heterogeneous case is larger. 
PROOF: As shown in section 4, the profit in the homogeneous market does not 
always rise with a cheaper production of the fringe. In the example chosen, the 















follows: e > 0.03. With non-negligible costs, fringe firms make a higher profit in the 
heterogeneous market.  
 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we present a model that allows us to compare the profits of fringe firms 
in a market with homogeneous to one with heterogeneous products. To make such a  
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comparison, some restrictive conditions are necessary that limit the generality of the 
linear demand system in the heterogeneous case. The producer surplus of the fringe 
firms in both scenarios is rising with market size and with the marginal costs of the 
dominant firm. It is declining with a stronger reaction to price variations. That is why 
profits can only be calculated through simulations with varying parameter values. 
These show that a fringe firm can achieve a higher producer rent in a heterogeneous 
market, if 
– the size of the market is not very small 
– demand for the products of the fringe firms is relatively inelastic 
– the marginal costs of the dominant firm are not too high and 
– the costs of the fringe firms are non-negligible.  
Since these conditions are probably fulfilled in many cases, a fringe firm should be 
searching for a niche for a heterogeneous product
9 and set its own price instead of 
merely imitating the dominant firm’s product and price even if market shares are 
smaller in the heterogeneous market. Opposing this could be the higher entry costs 




                                            
9 A niche can also be made up of the supply of products that the dominant firms ceased to offer as in 
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